Signaling

Here is the story:

...[O]rdinary least squares (OLS) estimates show that sexually active adolescents have grade point averages that are approximately 0.2 points lower than virgins. However, when information on the timing of intercourse decisions is exploited and individual fixed effects are included, the negative effect of sexual intercourse disappears for females, but persists for males.

Here is one explanation for it:

Teen boys who want sex out of teen girls have to spend a lot of time in sports, fights, clubs, signaling their attractiveness. Teen girls who want sex just have to say "yes", and the sex itself takes little time, especially given that teenage boys are the partners.

While pondering on this, I realize that signaling is such a fascinating topic in the field of economics. Here is my previous post on signaling. Is signaling simply a means to achieve the end? Or people also get utility in the process of signaling? If the answer is the former, probably we need to find ways to cut down the "costs" of signaling. On the other hand, a utility-generating signaling -- courtship for an example -- could well be an end itself. I tend to lean toward the latter.